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Abstract
In technology-based industries, incumbent firm often license their technology to potential com-
petitors. Such a strategy is difficul to explain within traditional models of licensing. This paper
extends the literature on licensing by relaxing the assumption of a monopolist technology holder.
Competition in the market for technology induces licensing of innovations and incumbent firm
may fin it privately profitabl to license although their joint profit may well be higher in the
absence of any licensing. A strong testable implication of our model is that the number of licenses
per patent holder decreases with the degree of product differentiation.
JEL classificatio D23; D43; L13
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1. Introduction
The importance of licensing as a means for generating revenues from innovations is
increasing in a number of technology-intensive industries. Degnan (1998) find that in
1996, US corporations received US$ 66 billion in royalty income from unaffiliate entities.
A recent study by Anand and Khanna (2000) on strategic alliances reports that licensing is
common in sectors such as chemicals, biotechnology, software, computers, and electrical
and non-electricalmachinery, accounting for about 20–33 percent of all alliances, depending
on the sector.
In some industries, it is fairly common to observe large established companies consciously
adopting a strategy of licensing for generating revenues. For instance, in chemicals, Union
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Carbide and Montecatini have actively licensed their polyethylene and polypropylene tech-
nology (Grindley and Nickerson, 1996). In the computer industry, IBM patent licensing
revenues reached $1 billion in 1998, accounting for over 10 percent of IBM’s net profit
(Rivette and Kline, 1999). In semiconductors, Texas Instruments is reported to have earned
royalties of over US$ 1.8 billion between 1986 and 1993, a figur comparable to Texas
Instruments’ cumulative net income during this period (Grindley and Teece, 1997).1 The
noteworthy feature is that often these firm license their technology to other firm that could
potentially compete with them.
This constitutes something of a challenge to the traditional wisdom that holds that an
innovator can best profi from the innovation by commercializing it himself (e.g. Teece,
1986). In this view, licensing is undesirable because the innovator has to share some of the
rents with the licensee, because there are considerable transaction costs in writing contracts
upon technological knowledge and especially because licensing increases competition, and
hence, dissipates rents.
Traditional explanations for licensing build on the idea that firm license if they are less
able (or unable) to exploit the innovation than the potential licensees, or they attempt to
establish their technology as a de facto standard, for instance when network externalities
are important.2 Both of these motivations are well known and accordingly we ignore them
here.
In this paper, we develop a model where the interaction between a market for technology,
where firm sell their technology through licensing, and a product market, where firm sell
their output, generates new insights for understanding firms licensing decisions. The key to
our argument is that competition in the productmarket creates a strategic incentive to license.
Specificall , licensing imposes a negative pecuniary externality upon other incumbents in
the product market, which the licensor ignores.3 Put differently, licensing reduces industry
profit because of increased competition but increases a licensor’s share of such profits As
a result, if there are two or more incumbent firm that have proprietary technologies that
are substitutes for each other, both firm may fin it privately profitabl to license, although
their joint profit may well be higher in the absence of any licensing.4
Our results are driven by two main effects that licensing generates on the profit of the
licensor. The first the revenue effect, is given by the rents earned by the licensee which will
accrue to the patent holder in the formof licensingpayments. The second, the rent dissipation
effect, is given by the erosion of profit that the licensor experiences in his own business
1 In the cases of IBM and Texas Instruments, part of these revenues might be due to patent enforcement actions
rather than to a deliberate strategic choice about whether and how much to license. However, Rivette and Kline
report that both firm have undertaken a policy of actively licensing some of their technologies.
2 The economic literature has analyzed several strategic motivations for licensing, most notably licensing as a
mechanism to deter entry, enhance demand or control prices, which we shall briefl review below.
3 Critical to the argument is competition in the product market. In our model, only firm with access to the
technology can produce. In principle, however, one can think of fringe firm that compete in the product market
but do not have proprietary technology to license. We briefl discuss this case in Section 2.1 but our main focus
in this paper is on competition between technology holders.
4 The presence of competing technologies is not a mere theoretical possibility. The chemical industry is a rich
source of examples. As reported in Arora (1997), Union Carbide, Himont and Mobil compete with each other
in selling polypropylene licenses; BP and Du Pont compete in polyethylene process technology; UOP, Mobil-BP
and Phillips Petroleum in methyl tert-butyl ethers (MTBE).
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due to an additional competitor in the product market. Notice that the rent dissipation
effect, although similar in spirit, does not coincide with what the industrial organization
literature has identifie as efficienc effect (see Tirole, 1988). The efficienc effect captures
the negative relationship between aggregate industry profit and the number of producers.
Whereas the efficien y effect is measured at the industry level, the rent dissipation effect is
measure at the fir level. Since we are interested in studying firms incentives to license,
the latter is the relevant level of analysis.
If there is only one incumbent in the product market, the rent dissipation effect dominates
the revenue effectwhenever industry profit aremaximized by amonopoly (i.e. the efficienc
effect holds, as is typically the case).5 Instead, when another incumbent exists the losses due
to increased competition are shared with the other incumbent in the product market so that
the licensor does not fully internalize the reduction in industry profits When the revenue
effect is larger than the rent dissipation effect, then firm compete not only to supply the
products but also to supply their technologies.
The revenue effect crucially depends on the inefficiencie of licensing contracts. Our
results confir that lower transaction costs lead to more licensing. The degree of product
differentiation across technologies has an important influenc on the magnitude of the two
effects. If the goods are differentiated, the licensee will be a stronger competitor of the
technology holder in the product market than of the other producers. This enhances the
rent dissipation effect and reduces the profitabilit of the licensing strategy. Thus we fin
that licensing will be more widespread as the degree of product differentiation becomes
lower. Moreover, one would expect that the rent dissipation effect would depend on the
production and commercial capabilities of the licensor. Large, well-established producers
have less to gain from licensing and more to lose from competition. Our results confir
that, all else held equal, research labs license more. Interestingly enough, the model also
yields a less straightforward result, namely that the presence of independent labsmay induce
producer–innovators to license more as well.
Finally, we show that incumbent firm would benefi from restricting their licensing
activity. This suggests that technology holders might have incentives to collude in order
to reduce or stop licensing and hence increase profits Interestingly enough, this also im-
plies that factors that stimulate licensing—for instance, stronger patents that might lower
transaction costs—potentially hurt rather than benefi technology holders.
The importance of strategic effects in vertically linked markets is not new and has been
discussed in many other multistage models of oligopoly (see Tirole). Within this strand,
our paper relates closely to the literature on delegation. As Vickers (1985), Bonanno and
Vickers (1988), and Hadfiel (1991) among others have argued, delegation allows a fir
to commit itself credibly to alter its behavior and thereby elicit favorable reactions from
rivals. We apply the insights from this literature to explain why and how much licensing
takes place. In our model, licensing is a credible commitment to expand production by
transferring the output decision to the licensees.
The mechanism at work is very similar to the one used by the literature on strategic di-
visionalization to explain the incentives of firm to create divisions. For instance, Corchon
5 Although assuming that the efficienc effect holds is a useful benchmark, it is not crucial for the comparative
statics we work out in the paper.
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(1991) shows that, by delegating output decisions to divisions managers who do not in-
ternalize the inframarginal effects of their actions, the fir can virtually act as a Stack-
elberg leader and therefore collect larger profit (see also Baye et al., 1996). Similarly,
Schwartz and Thompson (1986) argue that divisionalization can be used as a commit-
ment to expand production and hence deter entry. The difference in our paper arises from
the fact that with licensing contracts, rent extraction is not complete (because of transac-
tion costs), that we allow for product differentiation across technologies and asymmetries
across licensors (producers versus research labs), and that we endogenize the number of
incumbents.
By contrast, much of the literature on licensing—to which this paper is also strongly
related—has focused on the optimal licensing behavior of the monopolist inventor once
it has developed and patented a new technology or production process (see Gallini and
Wright, 1990; Kamien and Tauman, 1986). Katz and Shapiro (1986) discuss the optimal
number of licensees for a single technology holder who does not compete in the product
market. Instead, we analyze how the number of licenses sold is affected by competition from
other technology holders, by the strength of patent protection, and by the nature of demand.
When the innovator is also active in the product market, then either only minor innovations
are licensed (Gallini, 1984; Katz and Shapiro, 1985; Rockett, 1990a) or licensing is used
strategically to enhance demand (Shepard, 1987), to choose competitors after the patent
expires (Rockett, 1990b), or to deter entry (Gallini, 1984).6 Hence, one contribution of this
paper is to combine two strands of the economic literature, one on vertical-related markets
and the other on licensing that have been treated separately till now.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and char-
acterizes the conditions under which the equilibrium involves licensing and the effects of
the nature of demand, of transaction costs, and of market structure. Section 3 examines
the licensing behavior of research labs versus producers. Section 4 shows that, with multi-
ple licensors, increasing the efficien y of licensing contracts can diminish profitabilit and
hence the incentives for R&D. Section 5 extends our analysis to capture the interaction
between the market for technology and market for innovation. It shows that, under fairly
general conditions, allowing free entry into the market for innovation leaves earlier results
qualitatively unchanged. Section 6 brings together our main finding and concludes the
paper.
2. The model
Consider a sector where N firm have independently developed and patented proprietary
technologies for the production of a good. Such a good can either be perfectly homoge-
neous across technologies or differentiated. When the good is differentiated, each variety
is assumed to be an equally imperfect substitute for all the others.
Besides the N patent holders, we assume that there exist many potential entrants who
do not have innovative capabilities but can produce if they receive the rights to use the
6 In Shepard’s paper, licensing constitutes a credible commitment to a higher quality that, in turn, enhances
demand.
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technology from one of the incumbents.7 We also assume that other than licensing fees,
there are no entry costs. Incumbents can therefore both produce a product themselves (by
using their installed production facilities) and license their technology to potential entrants.
A licensee produces the same variety of the good as the original licensor.8
Let ki − 1 be the number of licenses sold by fir i = 1, 2, . . . , N. Hence, the total
number of firm that have the technology and can produce the (differentiated) good is equal
to
∑N
i=1ki. For analytical tractability we shall consider ki and N to be continuous variables.
We assume that the licensor makes a take-it or leave-it offer to the licensee and extracts
all the net surplus generated by the use of the technology through an upfront fi ed fee.
In particular, we do not allow for contracts with per-unit royalties.9 Instead, we allow
for non-exclusive licensing contracts, a common practice in technology licensing (see, for
example, Anand and Khanna, 2000).
However, as the large existing literature on technology transfer has emphasized (see, for
instance, Teece, 1977), contracting for technology involves transaction costs. These costs
include the costs of writing contracts as well as the costs of transferring know-how. Indeed,
it is well known that technology licensing can require the transfer of tacit know-how. The
tacitness makes it difficul for third parties, such as courts, to monitor the transfer of such
know-how. Thus, a buyer of technology must guard against the seller opportunistically
under-supplying know-how. Conversely, the seller must guard against the buyer holding
up payment for such transfer. Thus, licensing contracts may result in sub-optimal levels of
know-how transfer (Taylor and Silberston, 1973; Teece, 1977). We model transaction costs
as having a fi ed component, F, and a variable component which corresponds to a share
(1 − σ) ∈ [0, 1] of the profit earned by the licensee through the use of the technology. It
seems reasonable to assume that the inefficien y due to the sub-optimal levels of know-how
transfer would be roughly proportional to the overall value of the contract. In addition, this
matches the empirical findin that on average licensors capture only a share of the total
rents generated in a licensing contract (Caves et al., 1983).10
We analyze the following three-stage game. First, potential innovators have to invest
in R&D in order to develop and patent their proprietary technology (“competition in the
market for innovation”). Second, each patent holder decides how many licenses to sell to
7 This assumption guarantees that licensors do not have to compete for suitable licensees, implying that they
can extract all the net surplus generated by the use of their technology. Relaxing this assumption would reduce
the revenue effect (i.e. the amount of rents a technology holder can collect through licensing), thereby restricting
the parameter space under which licensing occurs at equilibrium. We can partially cover this case through an
exogenous increase in transaction costs.
8 Thus, our model is better suited for process licensing rather than product licensing.
9 The design of the optimal license contract, for both exclusive and non-exclusive contracts has been studied
by Katz and Shapiro (1986) and Gallini and Wright (1990) among others. Output based royalties are typically
used as a response to asymmetric information or moral hazard, or to induce licensees to reduce output. We ignore
information problems here. Restricting licensee output is sub-optimal for the licensor because the same outcome
can be achieved more efficientl by reducing the number of licensees and saving on transaction costs. Therefore,
a lump sum payment contract is the optimal contract in our model.
10 Notice that, besides transaction costs, there are several other reasons that we do not consider here, for the
licensor being unable to extract the full rents generated by its technology, including asymmetric information
(Gallini and Wright, 1990), bargaining positions of the parties and the ability of the licensee to invent around the
patent once licensing negotiations have begun due to weak intellectual property rights (Gallini, 1992).
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potential entrants (“competition in the market for technology”), and third, all firm that
have acquired the technology will supply the (differentiated) good (“competition in the
product market”). Notice that these three stages correspond to the distinction between
‘goods market’, ‘technology market’, and ‘innovation market’ introduced by the Antitrust
Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property (1995). For much of the paper, we
focus on the last two stages of the game, treating N as exogenous. However, in Section 5
we extend our analysis to the whole game showing that all results remain qualitatively
unchanged. We proceed by backward induction.
2.1. Competition in the product market
We assume Cournot competition in the product market.11 Inverse demand function for
each variety i has the following linear schedule:12
pi = 1−
∑
ki
xi − µ
∑
N\i
∑
kj
xj, (1)
for any i = 1, 2, . . . , N, where pi denotes the price, the firs summation is across quantities
supplied by firm producing i, and the second summation is across all quantities supplied
by firm endowed with technology different from i (N\i stands for all varieties but i).
Here, a key parameter is µ, which captures the degree of product differentiation across
varieties. We assume that µ ∈ [0, 1], with varieties being homogeneous for µ = 1 and
completely differentiated (independent) for µ = 0. To keep things simple, we assume that
all technologies allow production at zero marginal cost. Also, notice that we are implicitly
imposing that the good is perfectly homogeneous within the group (i.e. all firm using the
same technology) and equally differentiated across all groups.
Denote byπi(ki, k−i, µ,N) the profit accruing to each fir endowedwith technology i in
the last stage of the game, where k−i stands for the vector {k1, k2, . . . , ki−1, ki+1, . . . , kN}
of firm endowedwith technologies different from i. InAppendixA,we show thatπi(ki, k−i,
µ,N) = A−2B−2 where A = [1 + (1 − µ)ki] and B = [1 +
∑N
j µkj/(1 + (1 − µ)kj)].
Furthermore, πi is decreasing and convex in ki. Notice that for µ = 0 each firm’ profi
only depends on the number of firm producing that given variety. Instead, for µ = 1, πi
depends on the total number of firm active in the market
∑N
i=1ki.
2.2. Competition in the market for technology
Given the results of quantity competition in the last stage of the game, one can express
each patent holder’s profi as a function of the number of firm producing each variety of
11 We have also worked out a model with price competition andmultinomial logit demand (see Arora and Fosfuri,
1999). Many of the results derived here hold unchanged. Obviously, with price competition, we need to impose
some degree of product differentiation also within the same technology. Otherwise, the revenue effect would drop
to zero and the strategic incentives for licensing analyzed here would disappear.
12 This demand structure could be derived from the maximization of a quadratic utility function of the form
U(X1, . . . , XN) =
∑
iXi − (1/2)
∑
iX
2
i − µ
∑
i
∑
j =iXiXj , where Xi =
∑
ki
xi and Xj =
∑
kj
xj (Singh and
Vives, 1984).
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the good, ki and k−i. That is,
V i(ki, k−i, µ,N, F, σ) = [1+ σ(ki − 1)]πi(ki, k−i, µ,N)− (ki − 1)F. (2)
Each technology holder i chooses ki in order to maximize its total profi given by the
expression above. The first-orde condition is, therefore
V iki = σπi + [1+ σ(ki − 1)]πiki − F ≤ 0, for ki − 1 ≥ 0, (3)
where πiki is the derivative of π
i with respect to ki given k−i.
In Appendix Bwe show that the second-order condition is satisfie at any interior equilib-
rium. The first-orde condition (3) shows the two effects discussed in the introduction. The
firs one, σπi − F , corresponds to the revenue effect, the increase in profit from licensing
due to an additional licensee. The second, [1+ σ(ki − 1)]πiki , is negative and corresponds
to the rent dissipation effect due to an increase in competition in the product market. The
magnitudes of these two effects determine whether firm license at equilibrium, and if so,
how many licenses are sold.
Before studying in detail the licensing equilibrium with multiple technology holders, we
focus on a simpler case in which a single technology holder faces a fringe of downstream
competitors with no access to the licensing strategy. This case nicely illustrates how the
presence of other incumbents in the product market affects licensing decisions in the market
for technology, independent of the competitive pressure from other technology holders.
2.3. The case of a single technology holder with competitors in the product market
We analyze the case where only one firm fir i, can license its technology; the remaining
N − 1 firm do not have proprietary technology to license, but are able to produce and
compete in the product market. For simplicity and without loss of generality, assume that
µ = 1. The first-orde condition for fir i can be written as
V iki = −
σ
(ki +N)3
[
ki − 1− (N + 1)+ 2
σ
]
− F. (4)
It is easy to see that this expression is always negative for any ki ≥ 1 if N = 1. However,
if N ≥ 2, this expression can become positive for small values of F and σ close to 1,
evaluated at ki = 1. This result illustrates the key forces behind the licensing decision
of the technology holder. When other firm are also able to supply the product (N > 1),
by licensing fir i expands its market share at the expenses of all other producers. (More
precisely, what expands is the market share of producers using technology i.) Indeed, with
a homogenous good (µ = 1), by licensing, fir i increases its market share from 1/N to
ki/(N + ki − 1) while all other producers observe a reduction in their respective market
shares from 1/N to 1/(N + ki − 1). However, the presence of additional competitors in the
product market results in lower prices. For some range of parameter values, the benefit of
an expanded market share outweigh the losses from increased competition and hence fir
i chooses to license its technology. Instead, when the innovator is also a monopolist in the
product market (N = 1), the licensing strategy would not expand fir i’s market share, but
it does increase competition in the product market. Thus, a monopolist patent holder would
never license.
7
Finally, notice that fir i’s profit are at least as large with the possibility of licensing as
without it and that factors that make licensing more appealing (a reduction in transaction
costs) always increase licensor’s profits As we shall see later, this is not the case when
there are other technology holders that can react by licensing their technology as well.
2.4. The case of multiple symmetric technology holders
We now solve the game where N incumbents compete in the market for technology.
We focus on the symmetric equilibrium of the second stage of the game and explore how
the optimal number of licenses is affected by the parameters of our model. Defin Vk =
V iki
(ki = k−i = k, µ,N, F, σ) = σπ+ [1+σ(k−1)]πk−F , where π = A˜−2B˜−2 and πk =
−2A˜−4B˜−3[A˜B˜(1−µ)+µ] with A˜ = [1+(1−µ)k] and B˜ = 1+Nµk/A˜. In other words,
Vk is the derivative of the payoff function with respect to the number of licenses, evaluated
where all technology holders give the same number of licenses. Notice that one could solve
explicitly Vk = 0 and fin the symmetric optimal k. Unfortunately, the closed-form solution
is messy because Vk = 0 is a fourth degree polynomial with two imaginary roots and two
real roots. Accordingly, we proceed by using comparative static analysis to examine the
effects on equilibrium associated with changes in the parameters. A full characterization of
the equilibrium is provided in our working paper (see Arora and Fosfuri, 1999).13
Notice that most of the proofs of our propositions greatly simplify for F = 0. To save
space, inwhat followswe shall often impose this condition and simply conjecture how results
would change for positive values of F. Complete proofs are in Arora and Fosfuri (1999).
Proposition 1. In a stable symmetric equilibrium, k is increasing in σ and decreasing in F.
Proof. The key to the proof is that in a stable symmetric equilibrium, the direction of change
of k depends only on the sign of the cross-partial of the payoff function. See Appendix D.
One can directly verify that Vkσ ≥ 0 and VkF ≤ 0, thus giving us the required results. 
Note that Proposition 1 is completely general and does not rely on the assumption of
Cournot competition in the downstream market. It implies that any factor that decreases the
transaction costs involved in licensing contracts will increase licensing. One of these fac-
tors could be stronger patent protection. Indeed, Gallini (1992) argues that stronger patents
reduce the ability of the licensee to invent around the patent once licensing negotiations
have begun, thereby allowing the licensor to appropriate a larger share of the profit gen-
erated by the use of the technology. Arora (1995) formally shows that stronger patents can
mitigate the inefficien y in the provision of know-how, as long as patents and know-how
are complementary. Complementarity implies that the use of the know-how, which cannot
13 In our working paper we show that a symmetric Nash equilibrium, either with no licensing or with positive
licensing, generically exists. A symmetric equilibrium does not exist in the limit case in which F = 0 and µ = 1.
Reaction functions become parallel straight lines and never cross. In addition, we show that a stable symmetric
equilibrium with positive licensing (k > 1) is unique and provide necessary conditions for its existence (see Arora
and Fosfuri, 1999).
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be taken back from the buyer once transferred, is more valuable when used in conjunc-
tion with the complementary patents. This allows the licensor to use his patents to protect
himself against opportunistic behavior by the licensee. Insofar as stronger patent protection
reduces the transaction costs of technology licensing, the results reported by Anand and
Khanna provide empirical support for Proposition 1. Based on a sample of 1612 licensing
agreements, they fin that sectors where patents are strong are also those with a higher
incidence of licensing activity, while sectors with weak patents tend to have joint ventures
and other such bundled arrangements for transferring technology. We discuss the effect of
patent protection on licensing further in Section 5.
We now examine how the number of competitors, N, and the degree of product differen-
tiation in the market, µ, affect licensing.
Proposition 2. For F = 0, in a stable symmetric licensing equilibrium (SLE), the number
of licenses by each technology holder is increasing in N.
Proof. At any stable SLE, the direction of change of k depends only on the sign of the
cross-partial of the payoff function. By differentiating Vk with respect to N, one obtains
VkN = σπN + [1+ σ(k − 1)]πkN, (5)
where πN = −2µkA˜−3B˜−3 and πkN = 2µkA˜−5B˜−4[2A˜B˜(1− µ)+ 3µ].
Using Vk = 0 we can rewrite Eq. (5) as
VkN = σ
(
πN − ππkN
πk
)
+ F πkN
πk
. (6)
It follows that
πN − ππkN
πk
= µ
2kA˜−3B˜−3
(1− µ) A˜B˜ + µ,
which is always non-negative. Hence, VkN ≥ 0 at F = 0. 
From expression (5), one can see that an increase in the number of incumbents involves
two forces working in opposite directions. More competition reduces the magnitude of the
revenue effect, reducing the payoff from licensing. However, more competition also reduces
the size of the rent dissipation effect and hence reduces the opportunity cost of licensing.
At F = 0 the second force prevails. At F > 0, the two forces have different magnitudes.
Nevertheless, one can show that for small values ofN, increases in competition in themarket
for technology increase licensing. Only later, as the number of technology holders increases,
do further increases in competition decrease licensing by reducing the profitabilit of the
product market (see Arora and Fosfuri, 1999 for details).
We now state and prove one of the most robust results of the paper, one that can also
be empirically tested most easily, namely that the extent of licensing decreases with the
degree of product differentiation. The intuition is quite straightforward. When the good
is highly differentiated, each fir has a well-define market niche. Any entrant licensed
by the technology holder will be a close competitor to the technology holder himself,
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and the increased competition will be internalized to a greater extent. Instead, when the
good is homogeneous, the negative effect due to increased competition is spread across all
incumbents while only the licensor shares in the profit of the new entrants. As with the
comparative static with respect to N, there are two forces at work. On the one hand, less
differentiation implies a smaller revenue effect, but on the other hand, it also reduces the
rent dissipation effect. It turns out that the second force always prevails. This result holds
also for Bertrand competition with multinomial logit demand (see Arora and Fosfuri, 1999).
Proposition 3. At any stable SLE that involves at least one license per technology holder,
k is increasing in µ.
Proof. Weprove it by contradiction. First, notice that in a stable SLE, the direction of change
of k depends only on the sign of the cross-partial of the payoff function. By differentiating
Vk with respect to µ, one obtains
Vkµ = σπµ + [1+ σ(k − 1)]πkµ, (7)
where πµ = −2A˜−3B˜−3k(N − 1) < 0 and πkµ > 0.
Now, by contradiction, suppose that for some values of σ, Vkµ < 0. Notice that, given
Vkµ < 0,Vkµ = σπµ+σkπkµ+(1−σ)πkµ > σ(πµ+kπkµ) > πµ+kπkµ > πµ+(k−1)πkµ.
This implies that if Vkµ < 0, then ∂Vkµ/∂σ = πµ + (k − 1)πkµ < 0. Therefore, if Vkµ is
negative for some values of σ, ∂Vkµ/∂σ < 0 implies that Vkµ cannot be positive at σ = 1.
However, one can show that, at σ = 1 and k ≥ 2, Vkµ > 0 for all admissible values of
µ, N and F, resulting in a contradiction. Hence, Vkµ must be positive at any k ≥ 2 for all
admissible values of σ, µ, N and F.14 
Patterns of technology licensing in the chemical industry provide empirical support for
Proposition 3. Elsewhere (see Arora and Fosfuri, 2000) we show that the per-fir number
of licenses decreases with the degree of product differentiation in the chemical industry.
Homogeneous sectors like air separation, pulp and paper, and petrochemicals are marked
by extensive licensing, but we observe only limited licensing by producers in differentiated
product groups such as pharmaceuticals and organic chemicals.15
3. Research labs versus large producers
In this section, we analyze how the presence of firm with limited production capability
(i.e. research labs) affects licensing behavior. To simplify our analysis, assume that patent
14 Although positive licensing implies that k should be no less than two, in Arora and Fosfuri (1999) we show
that the result reported in Proposition 3 holds at any k > 1 when either F = 0, or N is not too large, or product
differentiation is low.
15 At this stage, one canwonder whether the socially efficien level of licensing is larger or smaller than the private
level of licensing. As long as N is exogenous, it is easy to see that, for zero transaction costs, private licensing is
always inefficient Indeed, in this case it is socially optimal to have k = ∞. However, with positive transaction
costs there can be excessive private licensing. This occurs for large enough values of N because the dead-weight
loss of the transaction costs grows accordingly.
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holders are of two types—those with manufacturing and marketing capabilities (producers)
and those without (research labs). In the latter case, their profi function only depends on
the (net) revenues from licensing
V rl = (krl − 1)(σπrl − F), (8)
where krl − 1 ≥ 0 is the number of licenses. As one might expect, research labs license
more than established producers. The intuition behind this result is fairly simple. Since they
have no production capability, the rent dissipation effect is smaller and, hence, licensing is
a more appealing strategy. This is stated below:
Result 1. Research labs license more.
Proof. Consider the first-orde condition for a research lab:
V rlkrl = σπrl + σ(krl − 1)πrlkrl − F = 0.
Now, evaluate this condition at the ki which is optimal for a producer with installed
production capabilities. It is easy to see V rlkrl > 0 giving us the required result. 
Perhaps less obvious is how the presence of research labs influence the licensing behavior
of firm with installed production facilities.
Proposition 4. AtF = 0, substituting a producer with a research lab increases the average
number of licenses given by the remaining producers.16
Proof. To show this result it suffice to prove that V ikikj > 0, since by Result 1 a research
lab always licenses more than a producer. Consider the cross-partial of the profi function
in (2) with respect to ki and kj , i.e. V ikikj
= σπi
kj
+ [1+σ(ki−1)]πikikj . Using the first-orde
condition one obtains
V i
kikj
= σ

πikj πiki − πiπikikj
πi
ki

 ,
where
πi
kj
= −2A
−2B−3
[1+ (1− µ)kj]2 ,
and
πi
kikj
= 2A
−4B−4µ
[1+ (1− µ)kj]2 [2AB(1− µ)+ 3µ].
16 For positive values of F, Proposition 4 holds for small values of N.
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Some additional algebra shows that
V i
kikj
= − 2σA
−6B−6µ
πi
ki
[1+ (1− µ)kj]2 > 0. 
What this proposition illustrates is an inducement effect. The presence of research labs
stimulates the licensing activity of the big firm at a level that it would not have reached
otherwise. Elsewhere (see Arora and Fosfuri, 2000) we provide empirical support for this
inducement effect. Using data from the chemical industry, we fin that firm without pro-
duction facilities tend to license more and that in sectors where such firm operate more
intensively, large chemical producers themselves tend to license more.
4. Incentives for R&D
In Section 2, we have shown that competition in the product market creates a strategic
incentive to license. By licensing, firm induce entry and increase product market competi-
tion. As well understood in the literature on innovation, an increase in the rate of diffusion
also implies a smaller incentive to develop the innovation in the firs place. This is precisely
what occurs in our model where a larger k reduces per-fir profits
Proposition 5. With ex-ante symmetric licensors, the possibility of licensing reduces profit
per innovator.
Proof. The licensor’s profi at any positive symmetric licensing is [1 + σ(k − 1)]
[1+ (1− µ)k + µNk]−2 − (k − 1)F . Taking the derivative with respect to k, it is easy to
show that such derivative is always negative. Hence, the licensor’s profi is maximized at
k = 1. 
Proposition 5 also suggests that technology holders might have incentives to collude
in order to reduce or stop licensing and hence increase profits An example of such a
practice is provided by the history of the chemical sector. Before WWII, cartels were wide-
spread. The major technology leaders, typically European firms adopted a strict control
over their licensing policies in order to keep market shares, deter entry and sustain prices
above competitive levels (see Arora, 1997). Such collusion in the market for technology
is explicitly analyzed in the Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property
(example 2).
Moreover, Proposition 5 underscores the ambiguous effects on the profit of technology
holders of factors that increase the efficien y of licensing transactions. Using the envelope
theorem, one can show that
V iσ = (k − 1)πi +
∑
j =i
∂V i
∂kj
dkj
dσ
,
where the second term is negative, and
V iF = −(k − 1)+
∑
j =i
∂V i
∂kj
dkj
dF
,
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where the second term is positive. The effect of σ (or F) on firms profit is ambiguous:
on the one hand, a larger σ (or a smaller F) increases licensor’s profits on the other hand,
it also stimulates (by Proposition 1) the licensing activity of all the other competitors and
hence reduces profits In particular, it is readily apparent that if Vk = 0 at k = 1, then
a reduction in the inefficien y of the licensing contracts would actually hurt technology
holders by increasing licensing and increasing the total number of firm in the industry.
This is stated formally in the following result:
Result 2. At parameter values such that Vk = 0 at k = 1, an increase in σ or a decrease in
F reduces profit of each technology holder.
Notice that the relationship between licensor profit and the parametersσ andF holds for a
larger parameter space than the one given inResult 2. Indeed, through numerical simulations
(available from the authors upon request) we have been able to construct several examples
that show an increase in σ or a decrease in F reduces profit of technology holders. Thus,
insofar as stronger patent protection encourages licensing (through higher σ or lower F), it
may even lower industry R&D or reduce the number of firm investing in R&D!17
5. The ‘market for innovation’: making N endogenous
Thus we have so far assumed that the number of incumbents, N, is exogenously given.
However, it is likely that in order to develop and patent a proprietary technology, firm
have to incur substantial costs (for instance, expenditures in R&D). A forward-looking fir
would not commit resources unless future profit are sufficientl large to recover initial
investments. Thus, factors affecting the market for technology are also likely to affect the
number of potential licensors, in turn will also affect licensing behavior.
This section provides sufficien conditions such that the results presented so far are
qualitatively unchanged in a three-stage game where initially firm decide whether to invest
in R&D, and if they do, then they play the game analyzed in Section 2. Specificall , we
show that even after modeling the R&D decision, k is increasing in σ, decreasing in F, and
increasing in µ. A sufficien condition for the results to hold is that dk/dN ≥ 0, which is
always satisfie for F = 0.
We assume that there are N¯ firm (with N¯ sufficientl large) that have the ability to
invest in R&D and develop new technology. The cost of R&D required to develop a new
technology isG, which is fi ed. There is no uncertainty, so if a fir paysG, it will develop a
proprietary technology. Instead, a fir that does not invest G enjoys an outside opportunity
that is equal to zero.18 We confin our analysis to the case where G is small enough to
support at least two firms For larger values of G either only one fir or no fir will invest
in R&D. The following result, that we state for completeness, is quite intuitive.
17 This is a simple Prisoner Dilemma situation.
18 Notice that a fir that does not become a technology holder could obtain a license in the second stage of
the game, from one of the other innovators. However, given the structure of our game all the rents earned by the
licensee are taken away by the licensor through an appropriate upfront fee. So, the outside option is zero.
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Result 3. A larger R&D fi ed cost reduces the number of incumbents, N, and the per-fir
number of licenses, k.
Proof. See Appendix C. 
The following two propositions, proved in Appendix C, generalize the results we derived
in Section 2 with exogenous N.
Proposition 1′. The per-fir number of licenses, k, is increasing in σ and decreasing in F.
Proposition 3′. The more homogenous the products are, the smaller is the number of
incumbents, N, and the larger is the per-fir number of licenses, k.
Proposition 3′ has a strong empirical implication. We should expect that differentiated
markets havemany technology holders but little licensing activity. Conversely, homogenous
markets should be characterized by a smaller number of more active licensors. Notice that
we cannot unambiguously predict the effect of changes in σ and F on N since, as explained
in Section 4, the effect of changes in these two parameters on per-fir profit is a priori
ambiguous.
A further qualificatio concerns the effects due to a change in the patent regime. In
Section 2, we argued that stronger patents can increase licensing by reducing transaction
costs (higher σ or lower F). However, broader patent scope or stronger novelty require-
ments may also increase G and hence reduce the number of firm that develop proprietary
technology.
6. Conclusion
There is increasing evidence that firm in some sectors are trying to profi from their
intellectual property not just by embodying it in their own output but also by licensing their
intellectual property to others, including potential competitors. Such behavior is difficul
to understand in the context of models with only a monopolist technology holder, who by
definitio faces no competition in the product market. By relaxing the widespread assump-
tion of a monopolist patent holder, our paper shows that licensing might be the result of
firms strategic behavior. Indeed, the presence of competition changes the incentives for
an incumbent to license its technology to potential entrants. In particular, when there are
multiple technology holders, not only do they compete in the product market, but they also
compete in the market for technology.
Within this framework, we showed that increases in the efficien y of licensing con-
tracts increase the propensity to license. Although licensing profit increase, the increase
in product market competition may reduce overall profit of the innovators. This implies
that stronger patents may be a mixed blessing for firm in technology-intensive industries.
Although stronger patents raise barriers against imitation by rivals, they may ultimately
result in increased product market competition by facilitating licensing. Since licensing
partially substitutes for production, firm lacking adequate downstream commercialization
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(production and marketing) capabilities are naturally more aggressive licensors. Interest-
ingly enough, our results indicate that their presence induces more aggressive licensing
by their larger rivals with commercialization capabilities as well. Our model provides an-
other important insight—increasing product differentiation not only softens price compe-
tition in the product market, but it also reduces the propensity to license in the technology
market.
Finally, from an economic policy perspective, the existence of a market for technol-
ogy implies technology diffusion and increased entry, improving the static efficien y of
the market. However, by inducing entry in the product market, a market for technology
may reduce the incentives to undertake R&D and hence restrict entry in the market for
innovation.
One limitation of our model is that it does not allow firm to have multiple technologies,
something we observe empirically quite frequently. Firms with multiple technologies may
have different substitution patterns and, therefore, different patterns of rent dissipation due
to licensing. Thus, relaxing the restriction of single technology firm and allowing themodel
to endogenize the number of technologies made by each fir could be an avenue of future
research.
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Appendix A. Deriving the producer’s profi function
Take any fir i (either patent holder or licensees) producing variety i. By maximizing
fir i’s profit with respect to its own quantity we obtain the following first-orde condition:
1−
∑
ki
xi − µ
∑
N\i
∑
kj
xj − xi = 0. (A.1)
First, impose symmetry across firm using the same technology. Then, by adding and sub-
tracting µ
∑
ki
xi we obtain
1− kixi − µ
∑
N
kjxj − xi + µkixi = 0, (A.2)
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from which
xi = 1− µ
∑
Nkjxj
1+ (1− µ)ki . (A.3)
Now, multiply both sides by µki and sum up across all possible varieties to obtain
∑
N
µkjxj =
[
1−
∑
N
µkjxj
]∑
N
µkj
1+ (1− µ)kj , (A.4)
which after some manipulation can be rewritten as∑
N
µkjxj = 1
1+ 1/ (∑Nµkj/(1+ (1− µ)kj)) . (A.5)
Then, substituting (A.5) in (A.3) and simplifying we obtain the equilibrium quantity by
each fir (either patent holder or licensee) producing variety i as a function of the numbers
of firm active in the production of all varieties (k1, k2, . . . , kN )
xi = [1+ (1− µ)ki]−1
[
1+
∑
N
µkj
1+ (1− µ)kj
]−1
. (A.6)
Replacing expression (A.6) in (1), we can compute the equilibrium price for each
variety, and then profit as reported in the text. Furthermore, one can show that
πiki
= −2A−4B−3[AB(1− µ)+ µ] < 0 and πikiki = 6A−6B−4[AB(1− µ)+ µ]2 > 0.
Appendix B. Second-order condition is satisfie at any stable SLE
We want to show that V ikiki < 0. The second-order condition is V
i
kiki
= 2σπiki +
[1+ σ(ki − 1)]πikiki . Using the first-orde condition, one can write
V ikiki = 2σπiki +
F − σπi
πik
πikiki = 2σπiki +
F − σπi
πik
(πiki )
2 3
2πi
.
Simplifying further we obtain
V ikiki = πiki
[
σ
2
+ 3F
2πi
]
< 0.
Appendix C. Proofs of propositions from Section 5
Denote the symmetric per-fir profi as
V = [1+ σ(k − 1)]π − (k − 1)F, (C.1)
where π = A˜−2B˜−2 = [1+ (1−µ)k+µNk]−2 and k ≡ k(µ,N, F, σ) solves Eq. (3) after
having imposed symmetry across all ki.
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C.1. Proof of Result 3
The key of the proof is to show that per-fir profit are decreasing in N. Indeed, one can
show that
VN = πN [1+ σ(k − 1)]+ ξ(·) dk
dN
< 0,
where ξ(·) = σπ + [1 + σ(k − 1)]πk − F < 0 and πN < 0. Hence, as G increases, N
decreases and so does k (dk/dN > 0).
C.2. Proof of Proposition 1′
Taking the total differential of (C.1) with respect to σ and N, one obtains
dN
dσ
= π(k − 1)+ ξ(·)(∂k/∂σ)
πN [1+ σ(k − 1)]+ ξ(·)(∂k/∂N),
where ξ(·) < 0 and πN < 0. Then, the net effect of a higher σ on k is given by
dk
dσ
= ∂k
∂σ
∣∣∣∣
N
+ ∂k
∂N
dN
dσ
.
Substituting and simplifying one obtains that
dk
dσ
= ∂k/∂σ|NπN [1+ σ(k − 1)]− (∂k/∂N)(k − 1)π
D
> 0,
where
D = πN [1+ σ(k − 1)]+ ξ(·) ∂k
∂N
< 0.
The proof follows along the same line for dk/dF and is omitted to save space.
C.3. Proof of Proposition 3′
Taking the total differential of (C.1) with respect to µ and N, one obtains
dN
dµ
= πµ[1+ σ(k − 1)]+ ξ(·)(∂k/∂µ)
πN [1+ σ(k − 1)]+ ξ(·)(∂k/∂N) < 0,
where ξ(·) < 0, πµ < 0 and πN < 0. Then, the net effect of a higher µ on k is given by
dk
dµ
= ∂k
∂µ
∣∣∣∣
N
+ ∂k
∂N
dN
dµ
.
Substituting and simplifying one obtains that
dk
dµ
= [1+ σ(k − 1)](∂k/∂µ|NπN − (∂k/∂N)πµ)
D
,
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where
D = πN [1+ σ(k − 1)]+ ξ(·) ∂k
∂N
< 0.
Hence,
sign
(
dk
dµ
)
= sign
(
1− (∂k/∂N)πµ
∂k/∂µ|NπN
)
,
which after some substitutions is equal to the sign of 1−(VkNπµ/VkµπN). Finally, we show
that (VkNπµ/VkµπN) < 1, so that dk/dµ > 0. Notice that
VkNπµ
VkµπN
< 1⇔ VkNπµ > VkµπN ⇔ πkµπN < πkNπµ.
Some additional algebra shows that πkµπN − πkNπµ = −4k2(N − 1)µ2A˜−8B˜−6 < 0.
Appendix D. Comparative statics at the stable SLE
Consider a stable symmetric equilibrium. Stability requires that thematrixwith the typical
element
∂V iki
∂kj
≡ V ikikj (ki = k−i = k, µ,N, F, σ),
has eigenvalues with negative real parts (Dixit, 1986). Since we are evaluating this
expression at a symmetric equilibrium, where V ikikj = V
j
kjki
∀i, j, stability implies that∑N
j (∂V
i
ki
/∂kj) < 0. Following Dixit (1986), a set of sufficien conditions for stability is∑N
j (∂V
i
ki
/∂kj) < 0 and V ikikj (ki = k−i = k, µ,N, F, σ) > 0, ∀i = j. We were able to
prove that the latter inequality holds for small values of N.
Now, we show that the comparative statics depend only on the sign of the cross-partial.
As an illustration, consider the comparative static with respect to σ. Let Vk = V iki (ki =
k−i = k, F, σ,N,µ) = 0 defin a stable SLE. The focus on symmetric equilibria implies
that one can examine a representative firm Hence, we can write the following:
dV iki =
N∑
j
∂V iki
∂kj
dk + ∂V
i
ki
∂σ
dσ = 0,
so that
∂k
∂σ
=
[
∂Vk/∂σ
−∑Nj ∂V iki/∂kj
]
= Vkσ−∑Nj ∂V iki/∂kj .
Since at any stable SLE
∑N
j (∂V
i
ki
/∂kj) < 0, the sign of the expression depends only on the
sign of the numerator, which is the cross-partial.
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